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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
There are two issues which require a reply from Mr. Nienburg. First is whether 
there was an ambiguity in the plea agreement relating to restitution. This Court 
exercises free review over the question of whether such an ambiguity exists. The 
District Court did not find an ambiguity, and so made no findings of fact that this Court 
must defer to on this matter. And if an ambiguity does exist, the law requires that it 
must resolve in Mr. Nienburg's favor. As one exists regarding whether he agreed to pay 
for the damage to the police cruiser, the ambiguity resolves in his favor, meaning he did 
not agree to pay for that damage. And since those damages were not a result of his 
culpable action (Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter, DUI)), the damage to the 
police cruiser cannot be claimed as restitution under the statute, and the order of 
restitution should be modified accordingly. 
Second is whether the District Court sufficiently considered the sentencing 
factors. The District Court's and State's continued reliance on immutable and 
unchangeable facts from his record to justify an extensive (and excessive) sentence 
is inappropriate and insufficiently considers the sentencing objectives in light of 
Mr. Nienburg's demonstrated ability to abide by the laws for the last eight years and 
participate in rehabilitative programs. These factors reveal that a sufficient examination 
of the sentencing objectives concludes that a more lenient sentence is justified in this 
case. Thus, Mr. Nienburg's sentence is excessive and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Nienburg's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether there was an ambiguity in the restitution agreement as to which of the 
claimed amounts were properly included as restitution, and which should be 
resolved in Mr. Nienburg's favor, making the restitution order for the damage to 
the police cruiser improper? 
2. Whether the District Court erred by not sufficiently considering the sentencing 
objectives by not sufficiently considering the mitigating factors - notably the fact 




There Was An Ambiguity In The Restitution Agreement As To Which Of The Claimed 
Amounts Were Properly Included As Restitution, And Which Should Be Resolved In 
Mr. Nienburg's Favor, Making The Restitution Order For The Damage To The Police 
Cruiser Improper 
A. Introduction 
The applicable standard of review in this case is de nova, as the District Court 
did not find that there was an ambiguity in the restitution agreement, and therefore, 
made no findings of fact on this issue to which this Court is required to defer. 
Therefore, this Court reviews, de nova, whether ambiguity existed. If it does, the law 
requires that the ambiguity resolves in favor of the defendant. Therefore, if the plea 
agreement was ambiguous regarding which damages were to be included in the 
restitution agreement, it must resolve in Mr. Nienburg's favor. Ergo, because there was 
an ambiguity, there was no agreement, and the damages to the police cruiser may not 
be included in the restitution order. Furthermore, since those damages were not the 
result of Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI), including the damage to the police cruiser as 
restitution is inappropriate as they are not within the scope of the statute. 
B. The Applicable Standard Of Review In This Case Is De Novo Because The 
District Court Did Not Find An Ambiguity Existed 
Plea agreements are governed by contract law standards. State v. Gomez, 
Docket No. 36545, _ P.3d _, (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 
741, 744 (Ct. App. 2002)). The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law, and thus subject to de nova review. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 
286-87 (2010). If that instrument is ambiguous, then interpretation of that instrument is 
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a matter for the trier of fact. Id. at 286. However, in restitution cases, ambiguities must 
be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595 (2010); 
see also Hughey v. U.S., 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (applying this rule specifically 
to a restitution issue). Therefore, if an ambiguity is found, it is to be resolved in 
Mr. Nienburg's favor - specifically, that he did not agree to pay for the damage to the 
cruiser, regardless of the lower court's findings. This is because the District Court did 
not find an ambiguity. 1 Thus, it did not engage in a fact-finding inquiry or make findings 
of fact to which this Court must defer, even though the State tries to suggest it should. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.5-10.) 
Therefore, the first step is to determine whether the agreement is ambiguous, 
which is a de novo review. Coward, 150 Idaho at 286-87. A contract is ambiguous 
when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. See Trinity Universal 
Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92 (2003); see also Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 
144 Idaho 813, 817 (2007). In this case, the agreement is ambiguous because it is 
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. (See Pet. Br., pp.9-13 and 
Resp. Br., pp.5-10.) Mr. Nienburg claims the agreement included only the damages 
which could properly be included as restitution under I.C. § 19-5304.2 He asserts that 
1 The Court's clear and repeated assertion was that "he agreed" to pay restitution and 
that the claimed amount was part of the agreement. (Tr., p.19, Ls.4-7; p.19, Ls.14-16; 
p.22, Ls.3-21; and p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.4.) Those constant assertions that the 
agreement included those damages reveal that the court did not consider that term of 
the agreement to be ambiguous. 
2 This statute allows the court to consider only "the amount of economic loss sustained 
by the victim as a result of the offense .... " I.C. § 19-5304 (7); see also I.C. § 19-5304 
(1)-(2). If, as Mr. Nienburg claims, the damages are not such a result, there would need 
to be an agreement pursuant to § 19-5304(9) for those damages to be included in a 
restitution order. 
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the damage to the cruiser was not a result of his culpable act (DUI), and, as a result, not 
claimable under the statute. (See Pet. Br., pp.5-8.) Therefore, they were not included 
in his agreement with the State to pay restitution. Contrarily, the State asserts that by 
agreeing to "pay restitution," Mr. Nienburg is foreclosed from challenging the amount it 
claims, since those damages were discussed during the course of the plea 
negotiations. 3 (Resp. Br. pp.5-10.) Therefore, because it is susceptible to multiple 
reasonable interpretations, the agreement is ambiguous as to the damages for which 
Mr. Nienburg agreed to pay restitution. Since the agreement is ambiguous, it then 
becomes a matter for the trier of fact to determine what the ambiguous term was 
intended to mean. However, because the District Court did not find an ambiguity, it did 
not engage in an evidentiary hearing to determine how the ambiguous term should be 
interpreted. Therefore, there are no findings of fact to which this Court can properly 
defer in this regard. As a result, at the very least, this case should be remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine what the ambiguous term was intended to include. 
However, since the law clearly requires the ambiguity to be resolved in favor of 
Mr. Nienburg, remanding this case for that purpose would be superfluous. The result 
will be that Mr. Nienburg did not agree to pay for the damage to the police cruiser 
because the ambiguity must be resolved in the defendant's favor. See Peterson, 148 
Idaho at 595; see also Hughey, 495 U.S. at 422. Therefore, including the damages to 
the police cruiser as restitution based on I.C. § 19-5304 (9) is improper because there 
was no agreement that those damages should be included and the issue must be 
3 Mr. Nienburg does not concede that the State's interpretation is a correct statement 
of the law or of his plea agreement, but he does recognize that it may be a reasonable 
interpretation of the agreement. 
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resolved in Mr. Nienburg's favor. Therefore, this Court should vacate those damages 
from the restitution order, since they are not properly included as restitution under the 
statute. (See Pet. Br., pp.5-8.) 
C. The District Court's Determination That Mr. Nienburg Agreed To Pay For The 
Damage To The Police Cruiser Is Clearly Erroneous In Light Of The Whole 
Record 
Should this Court decide to review the findings made by the District Court in this 
matter, the ultimate conclusion is that those findings were clearly erroneous and 
constitute an abuse of the District Court's discretion. See Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 
674, 678-79 (2009) (holding a District Court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless 
they are clearly erroneous). The State argues that, based on the court's recitation of 
the plea agreement, it is clear that IVlr. Nienburg agreed to pay the entire restitution 
claimed by the State. (Resp. Br., p.6.) That, however, is disproved by the record. In 
this regard, the court stated, "And, in addition, he agreed that he would pay the 
restitution and it's in an amount of approximately or a little bit more than $1,156.98 and 
he was free to argue for less . ... " (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).) 
There are two critical points in that statement that clearly demonstrate there was 
no agreement as to the amount of restitution. First is the word "approximately." That 
word means "nearly correct or exact." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 
38 (2007). Since, by definition, the court recognized that the stated amount was not 
correct, it is logically impossible for there to be an agreement that the stated amount 
was, in fact, correct. Since there was no agreement as to the correct amount, finding 
that there was an agreement as to the amount of restitution is clearly erroneous. 
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Second is the recognition that Mr. Nienburg was "free to argue for less." 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.5-6.) If Mr. I\Jienburg had agreed to pay the amount claimed by the State, 
there would be absolutely no reason for him to preserve the right to argue for less as 
part of the plea agreement. However, by preserving that right in the plea agreement, he 
clearly demonstrated his disagreement with that total claimed by the State. In fact, his 
attorney immediately exercised that right, which demonstrated Mr. Nienburg's 
disagreement with that total amount. Therefore, the finding that Mr. Nienburg agreed to 
the State's claimed amount of restitution is clearly erroneous. 
Specifically, defense counsel argued that the $1,088.98 claimed for damages to 
the police cruiser should not be included in the restitution calculation. (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.16-24.) The court's question and counsel's answer in this regard are revealing and 
demonstrate that the court's finding of an agreement on this point is clearly erroneous. 
The court asked, "And is your client willing to pay that restitution amount?" (Tr., p.18, 
Ls. 16-17.) To which defense counsel responded, "Your Honor, as a general matter he 
is and it's certainly part of the plea agreement that he pay restitution. We would like the 
court to consider perhaps that the second figure listed on page two of the state's 
proposed order, $1,088.98 is not actually restitution."4 (Tr., p.18, Ls.18-24.) This 
answer reveals that Mr. Nienburg was not opposed to the idea that he should pay 
restitution, but he was only agreeing to pay for damages that were properly claimable as 
restitution. Defense counsel also argued that the reason it was not restitution is that the 
damages were not the direct result of Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) pursuant to the 
4 It is unclear whether the damage to the uniform is even claimable under the statute, 
but as that amount was not disputed below, it is not challenged on appeal. 
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restitution statute(§ 19-5304). (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-15.) This argument makes no sense if 
Mr. Nienburg had agreed to pay the entire amount claimed by the State. However, it 
makes perfect sense if he has only agreed to the principle of paying restitution, but not 
the total amount. Ergo, the determination that Mr. Nienburg agreed to pay the entire 
amount claimed by the state is clearly erroneous.5 
The State also does not refute the policy rationales for rejecting its assertion that 
agreeing in principle to pay restitution forecloses an argument as to properly-included 
damages and total amount.6 (See Pet. Br., pp.12-13.) Those rationales are sufficiently 
discussed in Section I, C of Appellant's Brief, and need not be reiterated here, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
D. The Damages To The Police Cruiser Are Not Claimable Under I.C. § 19-5304 
(1), And Therefore Cannot Be Included As Restitution In Absence Of An 
Agreement By The Parties 
In absence of an agreement, the damages must be the direct result of 
Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI) in order to be properly claimed as restitution. 
I.C. § 19-5304 (1) 7. (See Pet. Br., Section I, B, 1.) The State attempts to counter this 
5 In actuality, the agreement was only that Mr. Nienburg pay restitution for damages that 
were properly claimable under I.C. § 19-5304, but not for the damages to the police 
cruiser that were not claimable as restitution. 
6 For an example of the State's assertion (embodied by a statement from the District 
Court) which reveals the abusive result of its position, see Respondent's Brief at page 7. 
Under this rationale, if a defendant agrees to pay restitution and thus promotes a plea 
resolution in this case, he is foreclosed from challenging any damages that the State 
includes in its claims. 
7 The Court also attempts to order this restitution pursuant to I.C. § 18-8003(2). 
(R., p.67.) However, that is inappropriate, as that section only permits restitution orders 
for "reasonable costs incurred by law enforcement agencies to withdraw blood samples, 
perform laboratory analysis, transport and preserve evidence, preserve evidentiary test 
results and for testimony relating to the analysis in judicial proceedings, including travel 
costs associated with the testimony." I.C. § 18-8003(2). Damage to a police cruiser is 
not covered by this provision. 
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position by citing to archaic, and sometimes non-jurisdictional, tort law. 8 However, 
modern Idaho restitution law recognizes that not every expenditure may be claimed 
under the restitution statute. State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(emphasis from original); see also State v. Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 776 (Ct. App. 
2007). Rather, it limits claims from what might be otherwise claimed in a civil 
proceeding (i.e. in a tort claim) to only those damages that "were reasonable and 
necessary to treat injuries caused by the defendant's criminal conduct." Card, 146 
Idaho at 114-15 (citing Doe, 146 Idaho at 283); see also State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 
692 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The damage to the police cruiser was not caused by Mr. Nienburg's criminal 
conduct - the culpable act for which he was found guilty - which was DUI. (See Pet. 
Br., pp.5-8.) As the court articulated, it was the result of Mr. Nienburg "running from the 
scene and leaving the door open." (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-20.) Those actions, however, are 
not part of driving a vehicle while intoxicated, nor a result of it. Mr. Nienburg was found 
guilty of an enhanced DUI. (R., p.69.) DUI only requires a showing that the defendant 
was "intoxicated" (by one of several methods), that he was in actual physical control of a 
8 The State relies entirely on the 1909 Idaho case of McLain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair 
& Racing Ass'n and the 1898 Vermont case of Isham v. Dow's Estate in this portion of 
its argument. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) In any event, the fact that Mr. Nienburg was 
the dog's owner does not subject him to per se liability for his animal's actions in tort. 
See e.g. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 608 (1999) (where the animal owner 
was able to establish he was not liable for his animal's damage to a vehicle); see also 
Griffith v. Schmidt, 110 Idaho 235, 239 (1985) (where the Supreme Court cites several 
cases in which an animal owner may avoid liability for damages caused by his animals); 
Stanberry v. Gem County, 90 Idaho 222, 227 (1965) (implying that the animal's owner 
would not be liable for damage done to a car by that animal if the driver was 
contributorily negligent). 
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vehicle, and that the vehicle is on a public roadway or private property open to the 
public. I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). The persistent violator enhancement only requires a 
showing that this was the defendant's third commission of a felony. I.C. § 19-2514. As 
neither exiting the vehicle nor leaving the scene are elements of these offenses, the 
damage resulting from such actions cannot be said to be caused as a result of 
Mr. Nienburg's criminal conduct. Therefore, it is not the result of a culpable action for 
the purpose of determining restitution. See State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372 
(Ct. App. 2007) (citing I.C. § 19-5304 (1)(e)); see also State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 
374 (2007). Ergo, without an agreement by the parties that these damages will be 
included in the restitution agreement, they cannot be claimed under the modern 
restitution statute, regardless of whether Mr. Nienburg would be liable for those 
damages under tort law, antiquated or modern. 
Therefore, since the damage to the police cruiser cannot be claimed under 
§19-5304, this Court should vacate that portion of the restitution order. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Not Sufficiently Considering The Sentencing Objectives By 
Not Sufficiently Considering The Mitigating Factors - Notably The Fact That It Had 
Been Eight Years Since Mr. Nienburg Had Been Charged With A DUI 
A. Introduction 
The question under review as to an excessive sentence is whether the District 
Court sufficiently considered the sentencing objectives. In this case, by failing to 
sufficiently consider the mitigating factors - most notably, Mr. Nienburg's efforts to not 
drink and drive, which had been successful for the last eight years - the District Court 
11 
did not sufficiently consider all the sentencing objectives. Rather, both the court and the 
State continue to point to the immutable and unchangeable history established in 
Mr. Nienburg's record as a justification to impose an extensive (and excessive) 
sentence. Such an approach is inappropriate and constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
This Court should remedy that abuse. 
8. The Continued Reliance On Historical And Unchanging Facts And The Failure To 
Sufficiently Consider Evidence Demonstrating A Departure From Those Facts 
Results In An Excessive Sentence And Abuse Of Discretion In This Case 
When imposing a sentence, the District Court must sufficiently consider the 
governing criteria of sentencing, or else it abuses its discretion. State v. Jackson, 130 
Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (citation omitted). Those criteria are the four sentencing 
objectives set forth in State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 
497, 500 (1993). In order to sufficiently consider those objectives, the court needs to 
sufficiently consider mitigating factors that may be present in a particular case. See, 
e.g., State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). Included in those mitigating factors 
are the defendant's character and amenability to treatment. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); see also Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
The State appears to contend that any consideration by the court is sufficient, 
based on the court's assertion that it considered all four sentencing objectives. (Resp. 
Br., p.14 (citing Tr., p.37, Ls.12-17).) While the court may have "considered" them, in 
that it took them into account, it does not mean that its consideration was sufficient. A 
trial court may consider a factor, but not do so sufficiently, and its decision will still 
constitute an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) 
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(finding that the trial court considered and rejected rehabilitative options, yet still failed 
to sufficiently consider the defendant's alcohol problem, record, or character, and so 
had imposed a sentence in an abuse of its discretion). Therefore, just because the 
court considered all four objectives does not mean that it sufficiently considered them. 
In this case, the District Court, as well as the State in its response, fails to 
sufficiently consider several mitigating factors and instead relies on Mr. Nienburg's 
immutable and unchangeable criminal record to justify an extensive (and excessive) 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with four years fixed. (Tr., pp.37-46; Resp. 
Br. pp.13-14.) For example, the State argues that his familial and community support 
should not be considered in mitigation because it has not helped increase the protection 
to society, as Mr. Nienburg has continued to drink and drive. (Resp. Br., p.15.) This 
argument, which focuses on his history of DUI in combination with this event, ignores 
the last eight years, in which Mr. Nienburg has demonstrated an ability to avoid drinking 
and driving.9 It applies similar rationale in its responses to the other mitigating factors 
present in this case. (See Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) Continuing to rely on these immutable 
and unchangeable facts in light of such rehabilitation, which demonstrates a decrease in 
the risk the defendant poses to society, constitutes an insufficient consideration of the 
sentencing objectives. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489 (citing State v. Eubank, 114 
Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988)). This Court recognized in Eubank that sentences are 
9 The State also argues that Mr. Nienburg has other, non-driving related offenses on his 
record, which should be considered. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) Again, its argument fails to 
recognize that no such offenses have been charged, much less successfully 
prosecuted, for nearly a decade. (PSI, pp.5-7.) This further demonstrates its reliance 
on only immutable and unchangeable facts and ignorance of the rehabilitative efforts 
Mr. Nienburg has made over the last decade. 
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to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person 
once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism. Eubank, 114 Idaho at 
639. This Court recently reaffirmed that principle in Cook. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489. 
Mr. Nienburg demonstrated that he can be rehabilitated. He has done all he can 
to get continuing treatment, even though he is indigent. (See, e.g., Tr., p.34, Ls.12-17 
(where defense counsel explained to the court Mr. Nienburg's efforts to secure funds so 
he could attend outpatient treatment).) Beyond that, his actions in general demonstrate 
his dedication to avoid driving when he has been drinking, which is the action the State 
correctly identifies as the one to be deterred. (Resp. Br., p.14 (citing State v. Oliver, 
144 Idaho 722, 727 (2007)).) While Mr. Nienburg does have a history of DUls, he has 
not received a new DUI charge since 2002. (PSI, pp.10-11.) This demonstrates a 
significant change, which he was able to maintain for nearly a decade, and which has a 
major impact on how best to protect society going forward from this incident. 
Mr. Nienburg has demonstrated an ability to comply with the law, but now needs to 
focus specifically on maintaining that fundamental change in his life so as to avoid 
falling back into his old ways. While similar to ~1is initial issues, these new issues are 
different enough that new goals in treatment will be useful to him, and thus a more 
lenient sentence (one that provides the opportunity for that treatment now is 
appropriate) so as to offer the best overall protection to society. Furthermore, timing of 
rehabilitation is an important aspect that the court needs to consider in this respect. 
See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971 ); see also Nice, 103 Idaho at 91. This 
Court has continued to recognize the principle that rehabilitation needs to be both timely 
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and effective. See e.g. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; see also Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. 
However, based on the policies of the Department of Corrections, Mr. Nienburg is 
unlikely to receive such treatment until he begins the pre-parole process, some three 
years into his sentence. 
The District Court's and State's rationale - that his past history justifies extensive 
(and excessive) sentences, regardless of rehabilitative efforts - is impermissible. Were 
it permitted to stand, it would establish a precedent where, regardless of an individual's 
efforts to rehabilitate himself, he will always be subject to extensive (and excessive) 
sentences, should he lose control of his situation at any point in the future. This 
approach actually detracts from the sentencing objectives. If no improvement will ever 
separate the individual from the immutable and unchangeable facts in his past, there 
will be no reason for him to engage in rehabilitation. That means more people will 
simply be required to serve time in prison and be released without effective treatment, 
resulting in a decrease in prevention of recidivism. The ultimate result is that society is 
less protected. The reason the court's and State's approach is impermissible has been 
best phrased by the California Supreme Court, as it considered this same concern in a 
parole context: 
under the circumstances of the present case-in which the record is 
replete with evidence establishing petitioner's rehabilitation, insight, 
remorse, and psychological health, and devoid of any evidence supporting 
a finding that she continues to pose a threat to public safety-
petitioner's [rights] were violated by the Governor's reliance upon the 
immutable and unchangeable circumstances of her commitment 
offense .... 
In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1227 (Cal. 2008). Following that same principle, the 
Idaho Supreme Court and this Court have continuously recognized that failing to 
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sufficiently consider the evidence in the record, regardless of the offense, constitutes 
grounds to vacate a sentence and impose a more lenient one. See, e.g., Owen, 73 
Idaho at 420 (First Degree Murder); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) 
(Armed Robbery); Nice, 103 Idaho at 91 (Lewd and Lascivious Conduct with a Child 
under Sixteen); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90 (Grand Theft by Deception); State v. Alberts, 
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (Sexual Abuse of A Child Under Sixteen); 
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 
Idaho 295 (1990) (Unlawful Delivery of Cocaine and Heroin); Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639 
(First Degree Burglary and Sexual Abuse of a Child). 
The District Court failed to sufficiently consider all the mitigating factors present 
in this case, and in so doing, failed to sufficiently consider all the sentencing objectives. 
Instead, it (and the State) relied on Mr. Nienburg's immutable and unchangeable 
criminal history to justify its extensive (and excessive) sentence. Therefore, the 
sentence imposed was excessive and constitutes and abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the plea agreement is ambiguous as to which damages would be 
properly included as restitution, there was no agreement to pay for the damage to the 
police cruiser. Those damages were not caused by Mr. Nienburg's culpable act (DUI). 
As such, Mr. Nienburg respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution order in 
that regard, or alternatively, remand this case for a new restitution hearing. 
Because the District Court did not sufficiently consider the sentencing objectives 
and the mitigating factors, it imposed an excessive sentence. As such, Mr. Nienburg 
respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or 
alternatively, remand this case for new sentencing. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2011. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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